by Gergana Tzvetkova*
The long-awaited, comprehensive European Union (EU) Directive on Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence is here! Adopted by the European Parliament in April 2024 and by the Council of the EU in May 2024, it will enter into force in June of the same year. Substantial expectations are being placed on the directive by European policy-makers, regional and national NGOs working on women’s rights and with victims of violence, and those who survived or are at a heightened risk of violence.
Two issues were central (I would say understandably) to the discussions surrounding the draft directive since it was proposed by the European Commission in March 2022. The first one was the definition of female genital mutilation, forced marriage, the non-consensual sharing of intimate or manipulated material, cyber stalking, cyber harassment, cyber flashing, and cyber incitement to violence or hatred as criminal offences. The second one was an effort to introduce the criminalisation of rape based on the lack of consent – a provision, which was ultimately not included in the document’s final version.
However, here, I will concentrate on several other key areas and subjects covered by this legislative act. Their importance stems, firstly, from the recognition that countering violence against women (VAW) and domestic violence involves denouncing patriarchal stereotypes about women and flawed notions that women are inferior to men and, secondly, from the realisation that tackling pernicious behaviours and activities in the cyber world would require fostering new skills and offering new types of support services to victims.
Importantly, the document is the first EU legislative act to mention that VAW is rooted in “historically unequal power relations” and that still existing perceptions about the “inferiority of women” need to be eradicated. The directive, hence, emphasises the centrality of understanding VAW as a form of structural discrimination and eliminating harmful gender stereotypes that underlie it. That such language and ideas had found their way into an official and binding document surely represents a positive step forward in intensifying efforts to combat VAW. Regrettably, following the text’s revision by the Council, the definition of “gender” does not appear in the final version (Directive (EU) 2024/1385). Although the word “gender” is frequently employed in the directive, the word “sex” was removed (for instance, what was “regardless of their sex or gender” in the draft is “regardless of their gender” in the final text) – the reason appears to be linked to Poland’s and Bulgaria’s insistence that “that the term gender could only be interpreted as meaning the same as sex” (European Parliament Legislative Train Schedule, 2023).
Recognising that women politicians, journalists, and human rights defenders constitute a group especially vulnerable to violence is another key development that deserves mentioning. This is all the more important when viewed in combination with the criminalisation of certain acts in cyberspace, as women belonging to this group are often victims of vicious online attacks and harassment because of their political and social views and their support for gender equality or feminist ideas and principles. This focus on women in visible positions is a crucial and liberating step towardsacknowledging that women are attacked not only in their “private” roles as mothers, wives, and partners but also in the public roles they choose for themselves, roles which are destined to have wide social repercussions. Linked to this is another limitation to the document’s scope, namely the decision to solely address sexual harassment at work. For instance, a 2018 study found that 85.2 percent of the approached female MPs reported being targeted with psychological violence during the term of office (IPU, 2018, p. 1). According to a 2017 report, 63 percent of the surveyed women journalists suffered verbal abuse and 41 percent – psychological abuse. Only in 45 percent of the cases, the perpetrators were people outside of the workplace, while in 38%, the abuse was perpetrated by a boss or a supervisor (IFJ, 2017)). Data like these highlight the importance of adopting broader definitions of workplace harassment (including for instance workplace bullying or mobbing) and, consequently, more wide-ranging frameworks for tackling it.
Finally, the directive states that specialised support services should provide support to victims of cyber violence as well (p. 34, paragraph 57) and that the persons and bodies investigating and prosecuting VAW should have the expertise and the tools to gather, analyse and secure electronic evidence (Art. 15(1)) (Directive (EU) 2024/1385). The definition of such responsibilities emphasises the gravity of cyber abuse, that it is as real and as detrimental as offline violence, and that both victims and those working with and supporting them should be familiar with ways to document and report violent acts and malicious behaviours.
Certainly, this short blog post could neither discuss all essential provisions of the new EU Directive nor outline all directions where further efforts are needed in the future. However, I conclude by outlining several issues or areas to observe closely in the months and years to come:
- How will the EU Member States transpose the EU Directive in their national laws? Directives are binding for Member States but it is up to them to choose the “form and method” of implementation.
- How are Member States going to fulfil the responsibilities laid out by the Directive, especially in relation to prevention initiatives, data gathering, and conducting awareness-raising campaigns on non-consensual sex as a criminal offence?
- What measures will Member States put in place to prevent abuse and harassment against women politicians, journalists, and human rights defenders?
- How will the transposition of the directive and its subsequent implementation affect the debates surrounding the ongoing contestation of the concept of “gender”?
Numerous additional questions will appear as countries and societies attempt to tackle the harmful phenomena and practices described in the directive, though the extent of their efforts will probably vary. Agreeing on the document was a long process that demanded compromises. However, putting its provisions into practice will certainly be more challenging.
Funding
The research for this opinion peace has been carried out within the framework of the project Stereotyping, Disinformation, and Politicisation: links between attacks against the Istanbul Convention and increased online gender-based violence (RESIST), which has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No. 945361. This paper reflects only the author’s views and opinions and the European Union cannot be held responsible for them or for any use that may be made of the information hereby contained.
*PhD, MSCA-COFUND/Global@Venice Research Fellow
